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Non-technical summary
Child labour has long been one of the core concerns of the International
Labour Organization (ILO). Since 1919, the year of the ILO’s foundation,
many international labour standards have been adopted in this field. In this
paper, the focus is on ILO conventions as the most legally binding form of
standards. If ratified by member states, they must be implemented into
national legislation and applied to labour markets.
The effect of the ratification of ILO conventions on economic
outcomes is a disputed topic in the literature. In this paper, two different
approaches to estimating the effect of ILO conventions on child labour are
used. In the first part of the paper, aggregate figures of children’s labour force
participation and school enrolment are compared between countries having
and not having ratified ILO child labour conventions. The sample consists of
over 100 developing countries and the indicators are collected for the year
1990. In the second part of the paper, individual-level data of schooling
enrolment from a number of developing countries are used to estimate the
impact of ratification of one particular convention (Convention No. 138) on
schooling enrolment. A difference-in-difference (or natural experiment)
methodology is used comparing schooling enrolment of two adjacent age
groups covered and not covered by this convention.
In neither parts of the paper, convincing evidence for the effect of
ratification of ILO child labour standards on under-age labour force
participation or school attendance is detected. By the year 1990, countries
under an international legal obligation to enforce minimum age laws had no
better performance in terms of child labour and school enrolment than
countries not bound by this obligation. A caveat for this part of the
investigation refers to data quality. Data may be subject to severe
measurement problems. However, using two different indicators relating to
labour force participation and enrolment in schooling, the picture was found
to be consistent.
Since aggregate data may be too coarse to reflect the true impact of
ratification, the second half of the paper uses individual-level data. Presently,
there are no comparative surveys on child labour force participation for a
sufficiently large number of countries. Therefore, school attendance is used as
an indirect outcome measure. In one part of the analysis, school attendance of
17 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa is compared between ratifying and non-
ratifying countries. The results do not offer evidence for the presence of an
effect of ratification for these countries. Another part is concerned with
school attendance before and after ratification in four developing countries. A
significant effect is found in only one of them (Nepal). In this country,
however, other policies had been in place that may have influenced school
attendance in the age groups covered and not covered on which the natural
experiment is based.
It is important to note that this study falls short of a full evaluation of
the ILO’s activities in this field. In particular, the effects of the ILO’s
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) are not
the subject of this study. By looking at the effect of ratification, this paper
concentrates on the evaluation of more ‘traditional’ ILO policies.
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11 Introduction
Child labour has long been one of the core concerns of the International
Labour Organization (ILO). The first convention in this field dates from
1919, the year of the ILO’s foundation. Since then, many additional legal
instruments have been adopted. Conventions are the most legally binding
instruments available to the ILO. If ratified by member states, they must be
implemented into national legislation and applied to labour markets. At any
given time and for any given ILO convention, there will be ratifiers and non-
ratifiers. The interest of this paper is in evaluating the causal effect of
ratification on several outcome variables related to child labour.
Apart from conventions, the ILO adopts labour standards in the form
of recommendations which, however, cannot be ratified. Since we are
interested in the affect of ratification, recommendations are not considered in
this paper. Clearly, there may be other ways apart from ratification how labour
standards can affect labour market outcomes. For instance, conventions and
recommendations could act as model legislation, transferring knowledge about
best practices (Swepston, 1982). They could be used as benchmarks,
facilitating comparisons between the current legal situation and internationally
recognised standards. However, the centrepiece of ILO standard-setting has
always been the adoption of legally binding standards, because it was believed
that countries acting without the constraints created by legal obligations would
opt for lower standards, putting those with more stringent labour regulation at
a competitive disadvantage.1
The effect of the ratification of ILO conventions on economic
outcomes is a disputed topic in the literature. Some authors raise doubt
concerning the ILO’s effectiveness, because it has no sanctions at its disposal
to safeguard compliance with the standards.2 Another drawback is seen in the
fact that ratification is voluntary. If conventions are ratified only by countries
                                                
1 The preamble to the Constitution of the ILO manifestly expresses this idea: ‘... whereas
also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the
way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries ...’.
2 See, for instance, Bhagwati (1995: 754).
2which already meet the standard given in the convention, then ratification
does nothing else but confirm the status quo.3
There have been a number of quantitative studies on the impact of ILO
conventions recently. Strang and Chang (1993) analyse the impact of ratifying
ILO social security conventions on social security expenditures. According to
their results, there is a significant effect, but only for industrialised and not for
developing countries. Rodrik (1996) and Mah (1997) estimate the effect of the
number of conventions ratified on labour costs and export performance.
Rodrik (1999) finds that ratification numbers have a positive impact on
manufacturing wages in a sample of mainly industrialised countries, but not in
a larger sample also comprising many developing countries. Flanagan (2003)
presents results from simultaneous estimation of ratification numbers on one
hand and labour costs, export performance and foreign direct investment, on
the other. He does not find an influence of ratification on child labour.
However, this result refers to ratifications of all kinds of standards, not to
ratifications of child labour conventions in particular. In a meta-analysis of
more than two hundred individual studies, Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer (2003) find that ratification of ILO Conventions on equal treatment
significantly reduces the wage gap between male and female employees.
While there are no quantitative studies of the impact of ILO child
labour conventions, there is a large number of studies dealing with the effect
of national child labour laws, most of them relating to the adoption of these
standards by industrialised countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see,
for instance, Angrist and Krueger, 1991, Goldin and Katz, 2003, Lleras-
Muney, 2002, and Margo and Finegan, 1996).
In this paper, two different approaches to estimating the effect of ILO
conventions on child labour are used. In the first part of the paper, we
compare the aggregate figures of children’s labour force participation and
school enrolment between countries having and not having ratified ILO
conventions. The sample consists of over 100 developing countries and the
indicators are collected for the year 1990. The relatively large delay in the data
                                                
3 When domestic politics are considered, however, there are a number of reason why there
may be pressure from political actors for ratification of conventions specifying standards
which have not yet been reached; see Boockmann (2001) and Chau and Kanbur (2002).
3is due to availability: the ILO data on participation rates in the age group 10 to
14, the best comparable data available for a large number of developing
countries, have been collected in the early 1990s. In the second part of the
paper, we use individual-level data of schooling enrolment from a number of
developing countries to estimate the impact of ratification on schooling
enrolment. We use a difference-in-difference (or natural experiment)
methodology comparing schooling enrolment of two adjacent age groups
covered and not covered by this convention.
The two approaches complement each other in several respects. While
the aggregate approach focuses on the impact of ratification in the long run,
the case studies based on individual data also investigate whether there is a
measurable impact within several years from the date of ratification. While the
first half estimates the impact of ratification both on enrolment and labour
force participation, the second half of the paper is concerned with schooling
enrolment only but uses more accurate data. And while the aggregate
measures do not fully correspond to the age bounds specified in the
conventions, it is possible to draw a clear line between protected and non-
protected children using the disaggregate data.
It is important to note that this study falls short of a full evaluation of
the ILO’s activities in this field. In particular, the effects of the ILO’s
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) are not
the subject of this study. By looking at the effect of ratification, this paper
concentrates on the evaluation of more ‘traditional’ ILO policies.
2 ILO conventions on minimum age
Child labour has been a subject of standard-setting for the ILO ever since its
foundation in 1919. The conventions adopted over the years deal with a
diversity of subjects:
– the setting of a minimum age for admission to employment or work (C5,
C10, C33, C59, C60, C123, C138);
– the prohibition of night work by young persons (C6, C79, C90);
– the requirement for medical examinations (C77, C78, C124);
– the prohibition of the worst forms of child labour (C182).
4In the following, we are concerned with minimum age conventions only.
Table 1 lists all of these conventions except those relating exclusively to the
maritime sector, which form a separate body of standards, and explains their
main provisions.
table 1 here
The table shows that ILO conventions are building up on one another,
becoming gradually more stringent over time. Moreover, they are increasing in
complexity. While the early conventions consist of only three or four articles
on substantive provisions, Convention No. 138 contains ten articles with
detailed requirements. The increase in complexity is partly due to a greater
degree of flexibility of Convention No. 138, which offers member states to
subscribe to initially less demanding standards. By contrast, the earlier
conventions contain universal standards. While the early conventions are still
formally open to ratification, the ILO does not encourage their ratification
any longer. To facilitate the operation of the ILO’s monitoring system,
member states often denounce the ‘predecessor’ convention when ratifying a
revising convention. For instance, as of spring 2004, 72 countries have ratified
Convention No. 5, but 59 have denounced it in the context of the ratification
of revising conventions.
ILO child labour conventions can be distinguished according to the
scope of application. The earlier conventions all related to particular sectors or
activities (such as agriculture, industry, non-industrial employment, and
underground work). With the adoption of Convention No. 138, minimum age
standards were collected into a common framework for all sectors,
maintaining, however, some of the inter-sectoral differentiation contained in
the earlier conventions.
The ratification record by 1990, the time of observation in the first half
of this paper, shows a diverse picture.4 With 69 ratifications, Convention No.
5 had received a relatively high number of ratifications (the average of all
conventions adopted prior to 1945 being 36). Convention No. 10 had been
ratified by 51 states. Among these, however, were only 28 developing
                                                
4 Ratification numbers and dates can be found on the ILO web site, www.ilo.org.
5countries. The ratification record for Convention No. 138 had also been
somewhat disappointing from the ILO’s point of view by 1990. In a report to
the International Labour Conference (ILO 1998), the International Labour
Office notes that only 21 developing countries had ratified Convention No.
138, none of them in Asia where the main problems were found (p. 22). It
states that the complexity of the text of the Convention and the difficulty of
applying it may have been an obstacle to ratification.
During the 1990s, major changes have been made to the ILO child
labour regime. These culminated in the ‘Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work’ of 1998 and the adoption of Convention No.
182 on the worst forms of child labour in 1999. Initiated by this policy
change, the ratification of child labour conventions has picked up dramatically
over the last couple of years. Up to June 2004, Convention Nos. 138 and 182
have been ratified by a total of 134 and 150 member states, respectively.
Since the number of ratifications of the conventions concerning non-
industrial employment is not sufficiently large to conduct statistical analysis,
we only look at the ratification of conventions relating to industry and
agriculture. Furthermore, we do not analyse the effect of ratification of
Convention No. 182, because data on the relevant  outcome variables is not
available. The scope of the study is limited to developing countries.
3 Economic analysis of child labour legislation
Do minimum age legislation and, in particular, international standards
requiring such legislation, reduce child labour? Economists have discussed this
question mostly in the broader context of whether there is a market failure
case for government intervention to restrict under-age employment (see, for
instance, Baland and Robinson, 2000; Basu and Van, 1998; Dessy, 2000;
Dessy and Palage, 2001; Ranjan, 1999, 2001).5 Several of these papers
explicitly consider the effect of either a total ban or a marginal ban (i.e., a cap
on the number of hours worked) on child labour as a second-best policy,
typically assuming that the ban can be enforced economy-wide. Even in the
                                                
5 Other contributions to the debate adopt a non-consequentionalist normative perspective,
arguing that child labour violates a universal human right (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995).
6more realistic case where penalties for child labour are not infinite, minimum
age legislation exerts a negative effect on the incentive to use child labour. If
employing children carries a penalty, or if employers have to pay bribes to the
labour inspectors if using child labour, employers’ demand for child labour
decreases, because economic costs of employment rise. If supply remains
unchanged, child labour is reduced.
One argument why legislation may fail to achieve the object of reducing
child labour is that it often applies only to certain activities. Even if legislation
covers the whole economy, it may not be enforced in parts of it, such as in
home production, parts of agriculture and fishery and, ultimately, in illegal
employment activities. In the framework of an analytical model, Basu and Van
(1998) show that if legislation applies only to certain sectors, a partial ban may
not reduce aggregate child labour force participation. However, it lowers
children’s wages, since it leads to excess supply in the sector not enforcing the
ban. The effect on the welfare of families targeted by the measure could,
therefore, well turn out to be negative.
There is an additional negative effect on wages if the sector where the
ban is in force (say, industry) is more productive and pays higher wages than
the uncovered sector (say, agriculture). In this case, there will be an inflow of
child labour into low-productivity employment as a consequence of
introducing legislation. A ban on child labour may, therefore, have undesirable
effects on the structure of child work, in the extreme fostering illegal and
hidden forms of employment (Baland and Robinson, 2000, footnote 20).
If child wages are reduced as a consequence of legislation, this leads to a
decrease in the wealth of families with working children unless this effect is
more than offset by the rise in adults’ wages due to the overall reduction of
labour supply. If, as is widely suggested (ILO, 2002), child labour depends
negatively on family wealth, the consequence may be that even more children
are sent to work due to a negative income effect.6  Thus, legislation which
does not apply universally may turn out to be counter-productive: a country
                                                
6 Surveying the available empirical literature, Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) report only
positive estimates for the own-wage elasticity of child labour. However, these estimates are
likely to apply only to the formal sector of the economy. Bhalotra (2000) finds a negative
own-wage elasticity for Indian boys, but not for girls.
7that bans child labour in some sectors of employment but not in others may
not decrease, and in the extreme even increase, the share of children in the
working population.7
Apart from problems with legislation in general, the effect of ratification
could be hampered by the lack of implementation by member states. The ILO
monitors the implementation of its conventions by a complex system of
evaluation (see Swepston, 1997). The Committee of Experts concerning the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, the CEACR, issues
‘observations’ in cases of severe and lasting cases of non-compliance with a
ratified convention. During the 1980s, the number of ‘observations’ on child
labour conventions was 34, counting only once those ‘observations’ that had
been made repeatedly. A problem is that ‘observations’ arise from the
comparison of the legal situation with the text of the conventions. If national
laws are not enforced, the CEACR is much less likely to notice non-
compliance. ‘Observations’ should thus be seen as measures of states’
compliance with their duties as legislators, rather than as indicators for the
enforcement of domestic legislation.
To conclude, while ILO minimum age standards could be effective
means to reduce child labour due to a decrease in child labour demand, they
might fail to produce the desired effect on several counts. While governments’
failure to implement conventions into national legislation or the low level of
domestic enforcement in general are often cited as the main problems for the
effectiveness of ILO standards, the fact that some minimum age conventions
concern only particular sectors of the economy may be even more damaging
for their impact on children’s aggregate labour force participation. Moreover,
even if a country has signed up to conventions concerning all sectors, the lack
of enforcement in specific areas may cause the effect of standards to
evaporate. Other policies, such as creating incentives for school attendance,
increasing families’ wealth by transfer programmes, or tackling the market
failure problem more directly, e.g. by removing credit market constraints, may
be more appropriate instruments in this case.
                                                
7 Similarly, if the economic burden of penalties or bribes paid to labour inspectors is borne
by families with working children, child labour could increase due to a negative wealth
effect.
84 Aggregate data on child labour and empirical methodology
Despite the attention the subject has found in recent years, there is a scarcity
of data on child labour comparable both over countries and over time. In the
following two sections, we use two data sources that contain information on
indicators closely related to the problem, although they do not match exactly
the definition of child labour from the ILO conventions. The first is the ILO
data set on the economically active population. This data is available by age
groups and contains the age group 10 to 14 as the youngest stratum. The
second is the UNESCO data on schooling enrolment.8
The reason for using two different indicators is that these two measures
complement each other and give some impression of the robustness of the
results. Both cover only some aspects of child labour. Since the ILO data is
limited to the age group 10 to 14, it gives no information about the even more
problematic phenomenon of child labour below age 10. Conversely,
employment of 14 year olds does not contradict some of the ILO
conventions. Concerning the usefulness of the UNESCO data, only some
minimum age conventions, such as Conventions No. 10 and 138, address
schooling enrolment directly. Our justification for using the data is that child
labour and non-participation in basic schooling are often two sides of the
same coin. While there is controversy in the empirical literature about the
effect of child labour on educational non-attainment (Baland and Robinson,
2000), studies based on micro-data typically find a strong link between these
phenomena.9
The UNESCO data are derived from questionnaires sent to national
education authorities. National statistical or educational publications are used
                                                
8 An alternative data source for enrolment in education is the Demographic and Health
Surveys funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which applies
the same survey instruments for about 50 countries, and is used in the second part of this
paper. Although aggregates based on these data would certainly be more exact than the
UNESCO data, we choose the latter because the number of countries sampled is much
higher.
9 For instance, Psacharopoulos (1997) finds that working children have significantly fewer
years of schooling in Bolivia and Venezuela. For the combination of work and school, see
Anker (2000: 272ff.). Mehran (2000) provides an attempt to cross-validate the ILO and
UNESCO data.
9to cross-reference figures.10 The data used refer to gross enrolment ratios in
primary education. The numerator of this ratio includes the number of
children enrolled in primary education. The denominator contains the
population age group corresponding to official primary school age.11 Since
children may remain in primary education beyond official age, gross
enrolment ratios may exceed 100 per cent.
The ILO data is based on population censuses and sample surveys
collected by national authorities.12 Various adjustments to the raw data are
necessary to ensure that the definition of the economically active population is
consistent over different countries. The concept of measurement was adopted
by the International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1982. It contains
full-time as well as part-time employees and includes individuals otherwise
engaged in education, unpaid family work, the armed forces, and the
unemployed.
A problem with both series is that they tend to be extrapolated from
only a few points of time. As a result, the degree of autocorrelation in the
series is high. Indeed, even taking five-year or ten-year intervals of the data,
we obtained a coefficient on the lagged dependent variable not significantly
different from unity in dynamic fixed-effects estimation both for activity rates
and for enrolment.13 The usual cure for this problem, first-differencing the
data over intervals of five or ten years, is not viable because the ratio from
‘signal’ to ‘noise’ is lowered so that no statistical correlations remain
significant.
Therefore, analysis is based on the cross-sectional variation in the data
for the year 1990, the most recent year for which ILO data are available.
Alternatively, we present results based on ‘long differences’ in child labour
and enrolment over the period from 1970 to 1990. The data set comprises
                                                
10 More information on the generation of the data can be found on the UNESCO website,
www.uis.unesco.org.
11 In the overwhelming number of cases age 11 or 12 in developing countries. Since the
variance of official age for primary schooling appears to be reasonably low, we do not
make corrections for it in our further analysis.
12 A detailed description of the construction of the data is given by ILO (n.d.).
13 Period dummies were included in these estimations.
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developing countries only.14 Figure 1 shows the distribution of activity rates
and enrolment ratios for male and female children in the sample. The figure
shows a wide variation of outcomes. As expected, enrolment ratios tend to be
higher for boys than for girls. At the same time, male activity rates are also
higher than the corresponding measure for females. This pattern is explained
by the higher percentage of girls engaged in activities at home and neither
working nor attending school.
figure 1 here
In the following, we present comparisons of mean activity and
enrolment levels, distinguishing between countries which have and have not
ratified the conventions under investigation. Furthermore, we examine
whether the changes in these variables between the years 1970 and 1990 can
be attributed to ratification. Results from OLS estimation of activity and
enrolment on ratification dummies and a number of other potential
determinants of child labour led to the same conclusions. They are not
reported but available on request from the author.15
It is important to understand which groups of countries one is
comparing, since there are several conventions which could influence activity
rates and enrolment. Comparing child activity rates among the ratifiers of a
low-standard convention (such as Convention No. 5) with a comparison
group of non-ratifiers of that convention may be meaningless, because some
of the countries in the comparison group may have ratified another, more
                                                
14 The data excludes the founding members of the OECD, together with Finland, New
Zealand and Japan, but includes Turkey. Former COMECON member countries are also
dropped from the data.
15 To account for possible endogeneity of ratification status, we also estimated all equations
by instrumental variables. Following Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003), we used
two different instruments for the ratification of child labour conventions: first, the total
number of ratifications on all ILO conventions reported for the individual country, and,
second, the number of ratifications of the individual convention within a ‘peer group’ of
geographically neighbouring countries. The year of ILO membership was used as an
additional instrument. These estimations yielded similar results as compared to
comparisons of means and OLS.
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advanced convention. Our strategy is to perform sets of binary comparisons
for countries which belong to a certain ‘ratification group’ with countries
which have not ratified any convention. Ratification groups are defined, first,
along the scope of the conventions, i.e., ratifications of conventions relating
to industry and agriculture are treated separately. Second, ratification groups
are defined according to the most advanced of the conventions a country has
ratified.16 This leads to the following ratification groups:
- countries having ratified no minimum age conventions;
- countries having ratified Convention No. 5 but no other convention;
- countries having ratified Convention No. 59 and possibly Convention No.
5;
- countries having ratified Convention No. 138 and possibly Convention
No. 5 or Convention No. 59;
- countries having ratified Convention No. 10 but no other convention.
For the ‘long difference’ effects, we consider the ratification of any ILO
minimum age convention, since there are too few ratifications for any single
convention over the interval from 1970 to 1990.
5 Results from aggregate data
Table 2 displays the means for both variables of interest for ratification
groups and t-statistics for the significance of the difference across these
groups. Since enrolment ratios, and even more so activity rates, do not seem
to be normally distributed, we display the p-levels of non-parametric Mann-
Whitney tests for differences in the distributions in addition to conventional t-
statistics. The Mann-Whitney test is calculated using the ranks rather than the
values of the variables and does not depend on the normality assumption.
                                                
16 The sequential nature of ratification of different standards makes the interpretation of
the results difficult. As a consequence of the construction of comparison groups, countries
which subsequently ratified more advanced conventions are missing from the group of
ratifiers of an early convention. If countries having ratified an early convention but having
failed to ratify more advanced conventions are a negative selection from the group of
original ratifiers, there is a downwards bias in the coefficient of ratification for the early
convention. This problem cannot be avoided since it is not possible to separately identify
selection into the different ratification groups.
12
table 2 here
Separate tests are performed for male and female children, since male
and female child labour may be affected differently by minimum age
legislation. The first three lines contain tests for countries having or not
having ratified Conventions Nos. 5, 59 and 138. The fourth line refers to the
ratification of a convention relating to agriculture only, i.e. Convention No.
10. Since the scope of application is different for this convention, the group
of non-ratifiers used as a comparison group includes countries having ratified
Conventions Nos. 5 or 59 but does not include ratifiers of Convention No.
138, which also covers the agricultural sector.
As mentioned in section 2, a reason why conventions may lack
effectiveness is incomplete compliance by member states. If member states
regularly fail to introduce the legislative measures required by conventions,
one should not expect ILO conventions to contribute to the reduction of
child labour. To account for non-compliance, the ‘observations’ issued by the
ILO’s expert committee (CEACR) in cases of non-compliance are used.
Ratification dummies are set from one to zero for countries having received
an ‘observation’ by the CEACR on the same convention during the 1980s.
Results are contained in the second and fourth columns of table 2 (activity
rates II and enrolment II), while the first and third columns contain results
using unadjusted ratification numbers.
The table shows that the hypotheses that the 1990 levels of activity
rates and enrolment ratios are the same for ratifying and non-ratifying
countries cannot be rejected at the five percent level for any of the ILO
conventions. From the first line of the table, it appears that countries having
ratified Convention No. 5 may even perform even worse than non-ratifiers
with regard to activity rates and enrolment, with activity rates being six to
seven percentage points higher and enrolment ratios being six to seven
percentage points lower. However, only for one of the variables used (activity
rate II) do the tests reject equality in means or distributions, and they do so
only at the ten per cent level. This might indicate that ratification is even
counter-productive. However, there is also the problem of negative selection
bias as mentioned in footnote 16. Furthermore, the effect disappears in the
13
OLS estimations (not reported). Regarding the other conventions apart from
Convention No. 5, ratifiers tend to perform slightly better than non-ratifiers,
but the differences are not significant.
The last rows of the table compare the differences in school enrolment
and activity rates over the 20-year interval from 1970 to 1990 according to
whether the country had ratified any convention during this interval. Results
were substantially unchanged when only ratifications of Convention No. 138
were considered (19 ratifications during this interval). The data show that
there are no differences in the change of activity rates for boys. For girls,
however, ratifying states exhibit smaller reductions than for non-ratifying
states; the coefficient is significant at the five per cent level. Again, the
significance of the effect disappears when control variables are added. No
significant differences are found for school enrolment. No countries in the
group of ratifiers received an ‘observation’ during the 1980s. Hence, there is
no difference in the results according to whether compliance is accounted for
in the measurement of ratification status.
6 An approach using individual-level data
In the following two sections, we investigate whether ratification of
Convention No. 138 has contributed to increasing school attendance of
children protected by the convention as opposed to children not protected.
The investigation is based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS), a project initiated by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) to provide data and analysis on the population, health, and nutrition
of women and children in developing countries. DHS Surveys are nationally-
representative household surveys with relatively large sample sizes (usually
between 5,000 and 30,000 households). For a number of countries, repeated
surveys are also available. There are different series of surveys (DHS I to III,
DHS+) using different questionnaires and sample sizes. Surveys are structured
into different parts which may not be included in all surveys. Questionnaires
are highly standardised across countries participating in the programme.17
                                                
17 For a history and overview of the surveys, as well as questionnaires and information on
survey methods, see www.measuredhs.com and Vaessen, Thiam and Lê (2003).
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School enrolment is taken from the household questionnaire. This part of the
survey contains a question asking for each member of the household whether
the individual is currently attending school. No further specification is given
as to which institutions count as ‘schools’. The question is not included in the
first series of surveys, DHS I, but is available in all subsequent surveys.
To estimate the impact of ratification on school attendance, we use a
difference-in-difference procedure based on the fact that Convention No.
138, by specifying an age limit for employment, gives protection to certain age
groups only. The task is to identify the additional protection (in addition to
other policies possibly in place, such as a national minimum age) ratification
provides to targeted children. An effect may be produced by the introduction
of new child labour legislation, by the extension of existing legislation to
sectors previously uncovered, or by improved enforcement of existing laws if
these laws are backed up by an international obligation. As some legislation
exists in all countries, the second and third mechanisms are probably more
important to this study than the first.
The age limit specified in convention No. 138 is the maximum of official
school leaving age and 15 years (whichever is higher), but insufficiently
developed countries may deviate from this provision by specifying a general
minimum age of 14 years (see table 1). All countries used for our analysis have
made use of the latter provision. Hence, children are covered up to their 14th
birthday in the countries under observation. If ratification has an effect on
school attendance, the difference in enrolment between individuals below 14
years of age and individuals 14 years or above should generally be higher in
ratifying states than in non-ratifying states. Specifically, the age groups
concerned in the following are children aged 13 and 14 years.
In the first set of estimates, we use data for all countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa for which DHS surveys are available, except for South Africa, Namibia
and Zimbabwe which are not comparable on the basis of history and income
per capita. Furthermore, we except Kenya and Zambia, where a higher age
limit in ratifying Convention No. 138 applies than in the other countries so
that a comparison would have to be based on a different age group. Two
countries (Benin and Burkina Faso) ratified the convention within or close to
the observation period, so we cannot treat them either as ratifiers or non-
ratifiers. There remain 5 countries having ratified Convention No. 138
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(Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Togo) and 12 non-ratifiers
(Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar,
Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda).18
A second set of estimates compares school attendance before and after
the ratification of Convention No. 138. This procedure requires that at least
one DHS II, III or DHS+ survey before the date of ratification and at least
one survey after the ratification date is available. Among the about 40
countries for which more than one DHS survey is currently available, there
are four countries which fulfil this criterion: Bolivia, Egypt, Nepal, and
Tanzania.
Since individuals’ ages are recorded in the data, the most direct way to
implement the difference-in-difference estimator is to compare school
attendance rates between adjacent age groups. Angrist and Krueger (1991)
have used this approach to investigate the effect of compulsory schooling
laws on school attendance in the US for the years 1960, 1970 and 1980. They
find significant effects for the earlier years: in states requiring youths to attend
school beyond their 16th birthdays, the difference between attendance rates at
15 and 16 years was significantly lower than in US federal states where youths
could legally drop out at 16.
Our estimator is similar in spirit to the Angrist-Krueger estimator, with
the exception that the comparison group comprises children not protected
while, in the Angrist-Krueger case, the comparison group is children always
protected. As in the Angrist-Krueger case, there may be a problem of under-
estimation of the effect if the comparison group of individuals is also
influenced by ratification. In particular, one would not expect that children
aged 13 at the beginning of the school year immediately drop out of school
once they have reached their 14th birthday. Rather, many of them will finish
the school year even if, in the absence of protection, they would not have
attended school. The longer the time from the beginning of the school year,
the more serious is this problem. If this behaviour is present, the difference-
                                                
18 See table A2 in the appendix for survey and ratification dates.
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in-difference estimates will be too conservative and should be only interpreted
as a lower bound for the effect of ratification.19
Drawing on Angrist and Krueger (1991), Margo and Finegan (1996)
propose a procedure resting on the time of birth within the year to identify
the effect of compulsory schooling laws. They are concerned with the effect
of compulsory schooling laws requiring children to stay at school up to their
14th birthdays in the US at the start of the 20th century. The particular
difficulty in their data is that school attendance at a particular date is not
available, but only total months of school attendance in a given census year.
Hence, a difference-in-difference estimate cannot be based on current school
attendance and current age. But since the exact date of birth is observed in
their data, a comparison can be made between an earlier cohort of individuals
14 years at the start of the school year and a later cohort of children whose
14th birthday occurred some time after the start of the school year. In this
way, they distinguish between children not protected over the whole school
year and children protected over at least a significant part of it. This approach
has the advantage that the comparison group does not contain individuals
who, despite being not currently under treatment, are still influenced in their
decision by a treatment completed at the time of observation.
As the data do not contain the date of birth, Margo and Finegan’s
estimator cannot be directly implemented. However, the month of
observation is available from the data. Based on this information, we define a
control group to contain individuals at the age of 14 if they are observed
within three months from the start of the school year and youths at the age of
15 if they are observed more than three months after the start of the school
year. The idea is that the vast majority of individuals aged 14 at the time of the
survey had started the school year at that age if they are observed directly after
the start of the school year. Moreover, in cases where the 14th birthday
                                                
19 On the other hand, they may over-estimate the effect of ratification if the ratification
follows a decline in child labour due to changes in demand or supply; see Moehling (1999).
Moehling proposes to use a DDD (difference-in-difference-in-difference) estimator to
reduce this bias. Unfortunately, her approach cannot be sensibly implemented with our
data. However, the issue is less pressing in our case, since we do not find significant effects
in the first place and, hence, we are more concerned about possible under-estimation than
about over-estimation.
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occurred briefly after the start of the school year, it is likely that individuals
either drop out immediately after turning 14 (since the end of the school year
is some time to go) or do not even start the new school year (since the risk of
being caught non-attending is small over a brief period of time).
Figure A1 in the appendix gives an example. In the Central African
Republic, the school year starts in September, and the field work for the
survey was conducted over the period from September 1994 to March 1995.
The comparison group includes individuals aged 14 observed from September
to November 1994, and individuals aged 15 observed in December 1994 to
March 1995. Clearly, this way of proceeding produces control groups that vary
in average age across countries due to differences in the date of the survey
relative to the start of the school year. Comparing between ratifying and non-
ratifying states, it is, therefore, important to verify that average age in the
control group is similar in both groups.
There are a number of other problems with the difference-in-difference
estimator in our context. In particular, countries may have introduced other
policies apart from ratification specifically directed towards particular ages.
These may be national minimum age policies or educational policies. If
children aged 13 are targeted by these policies but children aged 14 are not, it
will not be possible to identify the effect of ratification separately from the
effect of national policies. How convincing the evidence for an effect of
ratification is depends on the absence of these targeted policy measures.
Indeed, this is the main reason for looking at the time changes in specific
countries. While the effort required to track down all relevant national policies
in a cross-section of about 20 countries would be enormous,20 it is more
feasible to give an account of changes in these policies undertaken within a
short period of time. On the other hand, in a sufficiently large sample of
countries, national policies may be treated as a part of the residual variance as
long as ratification and policies are independent.
                                                
20 We did, however, look at the national minimum age. The result is that all ratifying
countries of our sample had a national minimum age of 14. Hence, the lack of a difference
in school attendance between ages 13 and 14 cannot be attributed to a national minimum
age influencing behaviour in the group of 14 year olds.
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7 Specification and results
Table 7.4 contains the means of school attendance for the different age
groups for the sample of 17 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. The upper
panel presents results with the comparison group of individuals aged 14, while
results from the lower panel are for the comparison group constructed in the
way described above.21 The data are weighted using the survey weighting
factors in order to achieve representativeness of the national aggregates.
Furthermore, the survey weighting factors are multiplied with country-level
weights giving each country equal impact on the results. In a different set of
estimations, we weighted the data according to total population, which led to
similar results to those presented here. However, these results were more
sensitive to the exclusion of particular countries.
table 3 here
The table shows that ratifiers and non-ratifiers in the sample have
similar levels of school attendance. Among those covered by the convention,
i.e. the age group of 13 year olds, ratifying countries have, on average, a 3.5
percentage point lower school attendance rate than non-ratifiers. It is
tempting to relate this finding to similar results from the aggregate data
analysis. However, the temptation should be resisted, since the result is likely
to change with respect to changes in the sample. The table also shows that the
difference in school attendance between ages 13 and 14 is minor, while
attendance levels off substantially after age 14.
If ratification of Convention No. 138 increases the protection of
children covered by the convention, this will show in a significantly positive
difference-in-difference effect. The upper DD effect in each half of the table
is simply the difference-in-difference in the means displayed in the table, with
the p-values taken from regressions and probit estimation with age group,
country and interaction dummies. We observe that the estimated DD effects
are small in magnitude and, in any case, statistically insignificant, no matter
which comparison group is used. If the second approach to defining a
                                                
21 Differences for the treatment group between the upper and lower part of the table are
due to differences in weighting factors.
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comparison group is used, average age in the comparison group is 14.66 for
ratifiers and 14.69 for non-ratifiers. Hence, any bias resulting from differences
in composition of the comparison groups according to ratification status can
only be minimal.
The lower DD effect is from an extended regression with covariates
explaining school attendance, since the observed changes may be attributed to
other factors apart from ratification.22 The DHS household recodes contain a
number of variables which can be used to predict school attendance. Apart
from age, there is basic information relating to the individual, such as sex  and
variables indicating whether the individual’s father or mother is still alive or
whether the individual is a regular member or a child residing only temporarily
in the household. There are also a number of characteristics relating to the
household or the household head. Among the former, the number of children
or youths below 6, below 14 and below 18 years living in the household are
used. Furthermore, there is information concerning possession of certain
household assets (such as possession of a bicycle, motorcycle or car, the
material used for walls and pavements, the type of water supply etc.). Filmer
and Pritchett (1999, 2001) argue that these asset variables can be aggregated to
a measure of permanent income even more accurate than income measures
taken directly from survey questions. We follow their procedure and perform
a principal components analysis of the asset variables, using the first principal
component as an indicator of the household’s wealth. A further dummy
variable indicates whether the household is situated in a rural or urban area.
Finally, we include dummy variables indicating whether the household head is
female and whether the household head has completed primary and secondary
education, respectively.
For all of these covariates, country-specific coefficients are estimated.
Average coefficients and their t-statistics are contained in table A2 in the
appendix. To indicate the range of outcomes, the table also contains the
minimum and maximum coefficients found in the estimations and the t-
statistics of these coefficients. Gender, family wealth and education of
household head have pronounced effects on school attendance. The presence
                                                
22 For studies on the determinants of child labour other than ILO conventions, see the
surveys by Brown et al. (2003) and Grootaert and Kanbur (1995).
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of small children in the household has a negative effect on attendance,
presumably because parents’ attention will be detracted from their school-age
children. Conversely, attendance is higher if there are household members
between 14 to 18 years of age. Most importantly, the difference-in-difference
results shown in table 3 are all insignificant, pointing to the absence of an
effect of ratification on school attendance. A sensitivity analysis with respect
to changes in the sample was performed by excluding, in turn, each country
from the sample. Again, no significant estimates for the difference-in-
difference effect were obtained in any of the subsamples.
We next discuss difference-in-difference estimates for changes in
ratification status over time. These estimates are performed for the control
group of 14 year olds only, since differences in survey date would have
produced changes in the average age in the control group had the second
approach been adopted. Table 4 shows that developments in school
attendance have been quite different across the four countries under
investigation. Bolivia, Egypt and Nepal managed to increase enrolment ratios
by quite substantial amounts. The highest increase is found for Nepal, where
attendance among children aged 13 increased by 11 percentage points. With
increases of about eight percentage points in Egypt and about five percentage
points in Bolivia, changes in these countries are smaller but still a marked
change. By contrast, Tanzania experienced a decline in enrolment ratios of
four to five percentage points from 1996 to 1999. This suggests that
ratification of Convention No. 138 could not prevent the decline in school
attendance observed over the period. This decline followed, however, a strong
increase in enrolment ratios from 1992 to 1996 in both age categories, but
particularly among youths aged 14 years (+7.8 percentage point as opposed to
+1.6 percentage points for children aged 13).
table 4 here
Considering the difference-in-difference results based on comparisons
of means only, none of the effects are statistically significant at conventional
levels. However, the effect measured for Nepal has the expected sign and is
large in magnitude: after ratification, school attendance increased by 4.5
percentage points more for children protected by the convention than for
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children not protected. Still, the p-level of the effect is higher than
conventionally accepted as a rejection of the null hypothesis of a difference of
zero. In the other cases, the difference-in-difference effect is insignificant.
Again, the variance may be reduced by accounting for covariates.
Results for probit estimations are contained in table A3. As in the previous
estimations, the influences of gender, wealth and education are highly
pronounced in the results, although girls have a lower probability of attending
schools than boys in Egypt, Nepal and Bolivia but not in Tanzania. The
difference-in-difference effect is again completely insignificant in Tanzania,
Egypt and Bolivia. The situation is now quite different for Nepal where the
difference-in-difference effect is now significant at the five per cent level.
These results suggest that school attendance improved for children protected
by Convention No. 138 more than among non-protected children. This can
be interpreted as the effect of the value added of ratification towards
increasing school attendance by lowering child labour.
A possible objection to interpreting these results as evidence for a
causal effect of ratification is that other developments, such as educational
policies directed at particular ages, may account for the estimated effects.
Table A4 provides an overview of national legislation, listing any changes in
national minimum age and compulsory schooling laws. Moreover, the World
Bank’s data base on projects and programmes has been searched in order to
account for development programmes possibly affecting the proportion of
children in different age groups going to school. The table suggests that
substantial measures in this area have been introduced in two countries of the
sample. In Egypt, there have indeed been wide-ranging changes to the legal
framework concerning children. The statutory minimum age was raised from
12 to 14 years in 1996. Moreover, Egypt made nine years of education
compulsory in 1996 (previously, compulsory education had lasted for only
eight years). The main impact of the increase in mandatory schooling affects
children older than 14, but some children of this age may also be affected.
The Basic Education Improvement Project financed by the World Bank and
active from 1993 may also have had an influence on enrolment, but increasing
enrolment was only one of several objectives of the project.
In Nepal, the Basic and Primary Education Project, financed by the
World Bank from 1992, aimed to strengthen the provision of primary
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schooling and to support a range of projects concerning non-formal
schooling. Covering all districts in the country, the programme was targeted at
poor and socially disadvantaged students in particular. Being focused on
primary education, the programme is likely to affect 13 year olds to a greater
degree than 14 year olds. Indeed, we find in the data that 62 per cent of all 13
year olds attending school were enrolled in grades 1 to 5 in the base year
(1996), while the corresponding number for youths aged 14 years is 44 per
cent. Thus, ratification of Convention No. 138 was not the only policy
measure in the observation period introduced to reduce child labour and
increase school attendance. The evidence does, therefore, not unambiguously
point to a positive effect of ratification. However, it may perhaps be read as
evidence that there is a joint effect of child labour standards and development
policies to increase school attendance.
For the other two countries, no changes in the legal situation of
children during the observation period were found. Moreover, while there
were several development projects in action during the period (many of them
under the roof of the ILO’s IPEC programme), there was no nation-wide
comprehensive programme aiming at eradicating child labour or raising school
attendance. Among the projects of the World Bank, the Bolivian Education
Reform Project was not directly aimed at increasing enrolment. Clearly, there
may be smaller projects at the regional or sectoral level affecting children at
ages 13 or 14 differently having escaped our attention, but these are unlikely
to have led to nation-wide changes in age specific enrolment ratios. Bolivia is
the only country in the sample found to be in non-compliance with child
labour conventions during the observation period. Bolivia repeatedly received
‘observations’ from the CEACR on Convention No. 5 on the matter of
apprenticeship of children 12-14, and an ‘observation’ in 2003 concerning
C138 on the same matter.
A brief summary of the results from the case studies is given in table 5.
table 5 here
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8 Conclusions
Using a diversified empirical strategy, we did not detect any convincing
evidence for the effect of ratification of ILO child labour standards on under-
age labour force participation or school attendance. The first part of the paper
has shown that, by the year 1990, countries under an international legal
obligation to enforce minimum age laws had no better performance than
countries not bound by this obligation. A caveat for this part of the
investigation refers to data quality. Data may be subject to severe
measurement problems. However, using two different indicators relating to
labour force participation and enrolment in schooling, the picture was found
to be consistent.
Since aggregate data may be too coarse to reflect the true impact of
ratification, the second half of the paper used individual-level data. Presently,
there are no comparative surveys on child labour force participation for a
sufficiently large number of countries. Therefore, we used school attendance
as an indirect outcome measure. Again, the results did not offer convincing
evidence for the presence of an effect of ratification for the countries under
investigation. The caveat for this part of the study relates to the applicability
of methods. If minimum age conventions have an effect outside the age group
to which they apply, we are likely to underestimate the effect. Moreover, if
there are policy programmes relating to particular age groups, the effect of
ratification cannot be identified separately from them. However, not all of the
case studies plausibly suffer from these shortcomings.
The view that ratification may have little more than symbolic meaning
is consistent with our results. But it would be equally consistent with our
results that ILO child labour conventions are effective informally as model
legislation guiding states in the design of labour law, even if they are not
ratified.23 In this case, it would not be the international standards as such
which fail to have an impact. Rather, it is only the character of the
conventions as legal obligations which does not provide an additional
incentive to keep to the ILO’s standards. Evaluating the ‘informal’ route by
which ILO standards may be included in national politics clearly would be
                                                
23 See ILO (1976: 30ff.) for a discussion of the importance of ratification for the
effectiveness of ILO standards.
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much more difficult than comparing the situation in ratifying and non-
ratifying states. In any case, a policy conclusion is that ratification numbers
should not be used as indicators of the actual situation concerning child
labour.
A third interpretation of the results could be that the fault does not lie
just with international standards but with the legislative approach to child
labour in general. Thus, even if ILO standards would be fully complied with,
an increase in compliance might have no effect on the amount of child labour,
and may actually be welfare-reducing for the individuals affected by it. More
appropriate policies may be to increase technical cooperation in order to
strengthen education systems and target poverty. Evaluating the effectiveness
of national minimum age laws is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in
the case of Egypt, the increase in the minimum age to 14 years did not appear
to have a positive effect on school attendance in this age group. This casts
doubt on the usefulness of a legislative strategy in general.
During the last decade, the ILO has made a number of changes to its
policies concerning child labour. In particular, the ILO has strengthened non-
legislative policies to eradicate child labour. The most important instrument in
this context is the ‘International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour (IPEC)’, which covers data collection, organises research and funds
technical cooperation projects. In the future, new and better data should
become available to evaluate the success of this change in strategy.
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Table 1: ILO Conventions on Minimum Age (except maritime sector)a
No. Title Year of
Adoptio
n
Ratificatio
ns (1990)
Main Provisions
5 Minimum Age (Industry) 1919 69 Forbids employment of children under 14 in industrial undertakings other
than family businesses.
10 Minimum Age (Agriculture) 1921 51 Forbids employment of children under 14 in agriculture within the hours
of school attendance.  Any other employment is not to prejudice school
attendance.
33 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial
Employment)
1932 25 Forbids employment of children under 14 in sectors not covered by C5
and C10, except for light work of children above 12 under certain
conditions.
59 Minimum Age (Industry) (Revised) 1937 35 Forbids employment of children under 15 in industrial undertakings other
than family businesses.
60 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial
Employment) (Revised)
1937 11 Forbids employment of children under 15 in sectors not covered by C5
and C10, except for light work of children above 13 under certain
conditions.
123 Minimum Age (Underground Work) 1965 38 Forbids employment in mines of persons below an age not less than 16
but otherwise specified by the member state. Some measures for labour
inspection.
138 Minimum Age 1973 39 Obliges ratifying states to provide a minimum age for work that
corresponds to the end of compulsory schooling and is not below 15
years. Insufficiently developed member states may initially specify a
minimum age of 14 years. Minimum age for hazardous work is 18 (initially,
16) years and for light work 13 (initially, 12) years. Applies to all sectors,
though exceptions may be given.
182 Worst Forms of Child Labour 1999 na Defines worst forms of child labour. Prohibits employment of persons
under 18 years in these forms of employment. Requires states to introduce
measures for monitoring.
a – C7 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920; C58 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936
Table 2: Activity rates and enrolment: comparisons between ratifiers and non-ratifiers
activity rates I activity rates II enrolment I enrolment II
male female male female male female male female
Obs. mean mean Obs. mean mean Obs. mean mean Obs. mean mean
C 005, levels Non-ratifiers 49 18.72 15.50 56 18.52 15.29 47 93.29 83.27 54 92.85 82.51
Ratifiers 30 24.98 20.55 25 25.99 21.55 30 87.68 77.11 25 86.27 76.42
p-value t-stat 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.36 0.41 0.30 0.43
p-value MW 0.16 0.25 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.43 0.13 0.53
C 059, levels Non-ratifiers 49 18.72 15.50 56 18.52 15.29 47 93.29 83.27 54 92.85 82.51
Ratifiers 18 18.12 13.18 16 19.11 13.65 18 99.62 89.81 16 102.34 92.33
p-value t-stat 0.89 0.55 0.90 0.68 0.38 0.44 0.19 0.25
p-value MW 0.97 0.60 0.90 0.66 0.45 0.37 0.20 0.19
C 138, levels Non-ratifiers 49 18.72 15.50 56 18.52 15.29 47 93.29 83.27 54 92.85 82.51
Ratifiers 17 17.17 13.45 17 17.17 13.45 16 98.80 92.11 16 98.80 92.11
p-value t-stat 0.74 0.63 0.77 0.65 0.46 0.30 0.42 0.25
p-value MW 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.45
C 010, levels Non-ratifiers 79 21.15 17.41 80 21.37 17.64 77 93.25 82.56 78 92.70 81.80
Ratifiers 18 17.89 13.19 17 16.68 11.89 18 90.43 82.59 17 92.81 86.05
p-value t-stat 0.46 0.29 0.30 0.15 0.67 0.99 0.99 0.61
p-value MW 0.55 0.31 0.37 0.18 0.48 0.84 0.73 0.81
Non-ratifiers 82 -7.62 -5.30 67 14.92 20.52
Ratifiers 32 -8.93 -3.34 30 7.30 16.98
All conventions,
differences 1970-
1990 p-value t-stat 0.24 0.04 0.13 0.43
Activity rates and enrolment I and II: not accounting and accounting for compliance, respectively, as described in the text. MW p-values are from
Mann-Whitney tests for equal distributions. Test statistics significant at the ten per cent level indicated by bold type.
Table 3: Differences in Differences: 17 African countries
Ratifiers Non-Ratifiers Difference
Treatment: Aged 13
(obs.)
0.569
(6484)
0.605
(10799)
-0.035
Control 1: Aged 14
(obs.)
0.562
(5086)
0.597
(9858)
-0.036
DD, no covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
0.000
(0.989)
[0.997]
DD, with covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
0.011
(0.490)
[0.703]
Treatment: Aged 13
(obs.)
0.579
(6484)
0.604
(10799)
-0.025
Control 2: Aged
14/15 (obs.)
0.486
(4730)
0.505
(9047)
-0.019
DD, no covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
-0.006
(0.674)
[0.645]
DD, with covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
-0.021
(0.177)
[0.168]
Weighted data using survey weighting factors and ensuring equal weights
across countries. P-values are based on robust standard errors from OLS or
probit.
Table 4: Differences in Differences, single countries over time
Country Age First period Second period Difference
13 years
(obs.)
0.842
(1152)
0.895
(1258)
0.054
14 years
(obs.)
0.768
(1100)
0.841
(1368)
0.073
DD, no covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
-0.019
 (0.408)
[0.911]
Bolivia
DD, with covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
-0.013
(0.552)
[0.712]
13 years
(obs)
0.728
(2257)
0.807
(2313)
0.079
14 years
(obs)
0.698
(2116)
0.778
(2283)
0.080
DD, no covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
-0.001
(0.972)
[0.830]
Egypt
DD, with covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
0.011
(0.575)
[0.469]
13 years
(obs)
0.613
(1024)
0.721
(1145)
0.108
14 years
(obs)
0.613
(1086)
0.675
(1116)
0.063
DD, no covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
0.045
(0.142)
[0.122]
Nepal
DD, with covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
0.057
(0.046)
[0.030]
13 years
(obs)
0.785
(1012)
0.709
(561)
-0.076
14 years
(obs)
0.775
(1048)
0.696
(429)
-0.079
DD, no covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
0.002
(0.956)
[0.986]
Tanzania
DD, with covariates
(p-value, linear)
[p-value, probit]
0.025
(0.564)
[0.753]
Weighted data using survey weights. P-values are based on robust standard errors from
OLS or probit. Effects significant at the five per cent level printed in bold type.
Table 5: Summary of results for the effect of ratification
Bolivia Egypt Nepal Tanzania
No significant effect
found. Increase in
school attendance in
both age groups
means that DD
estimator may suffer
from downward bias if
children aged 14 are
indirectly affected.
No significant effect
found. Improvements
in school attendance
mainly driven by
covariates.
Significantly positive
effect found, but
unclear whether this is
due to ratification of
Convention No. 138
or Basic and Primary
Education Project.
Ratification did not
prevent decline in
schooling among
children protected by
Convention No. 138.
Figure 1. Distribution of activity rates and gross enrolment ratios, 1990
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Appendix
Table A1: Data description
Ratification
date
Start of
school year
Type of
first survey
Date of
first survey
Type of
second
survey
Date of
second
survey
Countries with two DHS surveys used in the analysis
Bolivia June 1996 February DHS III 11/93 to
06/94
DHS III 03/98 to
09/98
Egypt June 1999 September DHS III 10/95 to
02/96
DHS + 02/2000 to
04/2000
Nepal May 1997 April DHS III 10/95 to
02/96
DHS + 10/00 to
03/01
Tanzania December
1998
January DHS III 07/96 to
11/96
DHS III 09/99 to
11/99
Countries with one DHS survey used in the analysis: ratified at time of survey
Malawi November
1999
January DHS + 07/00 to
11/00
Niger December
1978
October DHS III 01/98 to
06/98
Rwanda April 1981 September DHS + 07/00 to
11/00
Togo March
1984
October DHS III 02/98 to
05/98
Countries with one DHS survey used in the analysis: not ratified at time of survey
Cameroon August
2001
September DHS III 02/98 to
06/98
Centr. African
Republic
June 2000 September DHS III 9/94 to
3/95
Chad – August DHS III 12/96 to
06/97
Côte d’Ivoire February
2003
October DHS III 09/98 to
03/99
Gabon – October DHS + 07/2000 to
01/2001
Ghana – October DHS + 11/98 to
02/99
Guinea June 2003 not available DHS + 05/99 to
07/99
Madagascar May 2000 September DHS + 09/97 to
12/97
Mali March
2002
November DHS + 01/2001 to
05/2001
Mozambique June 2003 February DHS III 03/97 to
06/97
Nigeria October
2002
January DHS + 03/99 to
05/99
Uganda March
2003
February DHS III 03/95 to
08/95
Table A2: Probit estimation, 17 African countries
Coefficients common to all countries
Aged 13 0.12
(3.96)
DD 0.02
(0.39)
Country dummies YES
Average Minimum Maximum
Usual resident 0.17
(1.72)
-5.44
(-12.30)
1.79
(3.47)
Female -0.40
(-19.19)
-0.75
(-9.35)
-0.03
(-0.26)
Female Household
Head
0.17
(6.31)
-0.25
(-2.13)
0.84
(6.17)
Members under 6 -0.09
(-6.91)
-0.21
(-3.14)
0.01
(0.30)
Members under 14 -0.01
(-0.68)
-0.12
(-2.67)
0.07
(1.38)
Members under 18 0.05
(4.48)
-0.03
(-0.79)
0.14
(3.52)
Household head:
primary education
0.41
(15.00)
0.05
(0.78)
0.98
(9.19)
Household head:
secondary education
0.62
(16.94)
0.04
(0.36)
1.24
(8.54)
Household wealth 0.11
(13.06)
-0.07
(-1.84)
0.32
(9.06)
Rural area -0.10
(-3.38)
-0.78
(-7.14)
0.66
(4.09)
Number of
observations
31091
LL initial -20955.4
LL final -15959.5
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors estimated robustly.
Average coefficients are the coefficients obtained from including the
independent variable linearly, with the 16 coefficients of the interaction terms
constrained to sum to unity. Standard errors of minimum (maximum)
coefficients are from a regression with 17 interaction terms. Coefficients
significant at the five per cent level printed in bold type.
Table A3: Probit estimation, single countries over time
Bolivia Egypt Nepal Tanzania
Age 13 0.28
       (3.35)
0.06
  (0.97)
0.05
(0.73)
-0.03
(0.35)
Usual resident 0.18
(1.03)
0.24
(1.06)
0.28
(2.05)
0.88
(4.69)
Female -0.37
(-7.08)
-0.32
 (-8.78)
-0.63
(-14.03)
-0.08
(-1.27)
Female Household
Head
0.07
(0.95)
0.05
(0.87)
0.31
(4.23)
0.21
(2.72)
Mother alive 0.37
(3.18)
0.29
(2.78)
Father alive 0.07
(0.82)
Members under 6 -0.19
(-4.57)
-0.08
(-3.23)
-0.20
(-6.32)
-0.13
(-3.21)
Members under 14 0.04
(0.99)
0.07
(2.39)
-0.04
(-1.09)
0.08
(1.74)
Members under 18 -0.05
 (-1.25)
-0.08
(-3.66)
0.07
(2.09)
-0.02
(-0.41)
Household head:
primary education
0.29
 (3.85)
0.39
(9.36)
0.27
(5.00)
0.49
(7.61)
Household head:
secondary education
0.31
(3.56)
0.95
(16.86)
0.57
(8.45)
0.51
 (3.52)
Household wealth 0.13
 (6.63)
0.22
 (16.93)
0.18
(6.96)
0.07
(2.33)
Rural area -0.52
(-7.24)
0.04
(0.85)
0.09
(0.91)
0.04
 (0.43)
Dummy for second
period
0.22
(3.07)
0.12
(2.39)
0.06
(0.98)
-0.27
 (-2.70)
DD 0.04
 (0.37)
0.05
(0.72)
0.19
(2.17)
0.04
 (0.31)
Number of
observations
4773 8965 4355 2999
LL initial -2099.4 -4994.8 -2800.7 -2078.7
LL final -1742.3 -4165.8 -2452.6 -1570.4
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors estimated robustly. Coefficients significant
at the five per cent level printed in bold type.
Table A4: Institutions influencing child labour
Bolivia Egypt Nepal Tanzania
Minimum age for
employment
Prohibition of
work under 14
for all
employment, but
apprenticeship
for children 12-
14 admissible
Prior to 1996: 12
years. Under the
Child Law
adopted in March
1996, the
minimum age for
admission to
employment is 14
years but allows
children between
the ages of twelve
and fourteen to
receive vocational
training .
Children’s Act of
1992 prohibits
the employment
of children under
14 years
Employment
ordinance sets
minimum age at
12 years, but 15
years in specific
sectors
Compulsory
schooling
Compulsory for a
minimum of 8
years for children
aged 6 to 14
Compulsory
schooling
increased from 8
to 9 years in 1999
Legislation exists
only in a
comparatively
small number of
districts
Compulsory for
children between
the ages of 7 and
13
Participation in
IPEC
from 1996 from 1996 from 1994 from 1994
World Bank
programmes
relating to
education
Education
Reform Project,
1994-2004
Education
Enhancement
Program Project
(1996-2004),
Basic Education
Improvement
Project (1993-
2003)
Nepal Basic and
Primary
Education
Project, round 1
(1992-99), round
2 (1999-2004)
Education
Planning and
Rehabilitation
Project, 1990-97
Observations by
the CEACR from
1990
Convention No.
5 (1990, 1992,
1994, 1995, 1996,
1997)
Convention No.
138 (2003)
Sources: ILO (1991), NATLEX data base, the World Bank, and information from governments
and NGOs published on the internet.
Figure A1: Construction of the comparison group, Central African Republic
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